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A Crumbling European Consensus ?
The politics of resentment call the original narrative built around the rule of law into
question by proposing a competing one, that of fundamental disagreements over values
and the inability of today’s European Union to keep fostering mutual trust. The politics of
resentment poses an existential threat to the consensus because the commonality of
values and interests is replaced with unbridgeable difference. The values that brought
together the parties to the consensus are now given distinctively national interpretation
without regard to others and the EU legal system. An argument is made that the concept of
common values is too ephemeral and far from crystalized. Given the fundamental and
persistent disagreements over basic (not just any) values that the politics of resentment
bring to the fore, the pressing question is whether “we” exist at all. With different
conceptions of the rule of law (no independent judiciary, checks and balances and judicial
review) and human rights, the consensus is coming apart at the seams. These concepts
were thought of as the basic minimum that all the parties to the consensus agreed to
respect when they decided to join. The consensus loses its discursive value when Poland
rejects bargaining and, rather than “voicing” its concerns within the pre-agreed framework
that consensus offers, choses to “exit” unilaterally.
We should be clear about the kind of challenges the European consensus is facing right
now. With the politics of resentment on the rise, „the European consensus” might be just
minutes away from a most fundamental challenge of “mega-politics” of identity and self-
survival. Why? The „overlapping consensus” recognized that the European polity is
composed of distinct peoples and respects other peoples’ ways of lives. Yet, for a
consensus to work, „we” the European peoples’ should acknowledge certain fundamentals
that bind and discipline us and that brought us together. Part of the deal behind the
overlapping consensus has always been the acknowledgment that parties are ready to
enter into a bargaining process in order to find similar grounds of understanding of the
fundamental commitments. Bargaining presupposes managing the disagreement over time
in order to build a common understanding of the basic principles.
However, parties with unreasonable and irrational doctrines that question the liberal
democracy as a form of government must be excluded from the consensus. This is so
because the disagreement must not undermine all parties’ commitment to support liberal
democratic principles under a democratic constitutional regime. The emerging constitutional
doctrine of the politics of resentment is anything but reasonable and rational within the
meaning of the consensus that brought parties together. Resentment-driven constitutional
capture in Poland undermines the very idea of Europe, together with the principles of
liberalism, tolerance, ‘living together’, and ‘never again constitutionalism’. It replaces these
founding principles with zero-sum politics, a vision of ‘us vs. them’ and a competing
1/3
constitutional narrative of fundamental disagreement over values. It proclaims that “we, the
European peoples” are not ready to live together in one pluralistic constitutional regime. It
becomes clear that the politics of resentment backed up by capture not only challenges the
standard story of the origin of the EU – that it was founded to bring peace and prosperity to
Europe by ending the possibility of war and encouraging the common rebuilding of
economies – but also puts forward a new and competing constitutional project and design.
The Consensus in the Court-Room: Enforced or … Lost 
For the EU to have a chance against the rising politics of resentment, the language, and
perspectives through which the EU looks at the member states, must be challenged and
change. “Essential characteristics of EU law” (term used by the Court of Justice in its
Opinion 2/13, para 167), must go today beyond traditional “First Principles” of supremacy
and direct effect, to embrace the rule of law, separation of powers, independence of the
judiciary and enforceability of these principles as part of the ever-evolving consensus.
Together these essential characteristics of EU law have given rise to what the Court has
imaginatively called: « a structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent
legal relations linking the EU and its Member States, and its Member States with each
other, which are now engaged, as is recalled in the second paragraph of Article 1 TEU, in a
‘process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe ». When it comes
to fundamentals, there is no place for bargaining. „First Principles” (I borrow the term from
Sir D. Edward’s An Appeal to First Principles; on file with the author) demand fidelity and
action and call for reexamination in the light of a rebuttable presumption that values like
rule of law are … no longer shared.
When faced for the first time with the politics of resentment in the logging case, the Court,
by imposing a penalty payment on Poland, not only defended itself in the spirit of judicial
self-defence, but also spoke on behalf of the consensus and its cohesiveness. The Court
we saw in the Commission v Poland was the „Court of old”; guardian of the „Community
integrity” and effectiveness. Art. 2 TEU forms part of the EU law senso largo in the same
way the Court has interpreted the term „law” in what once was called the most important
legal provision of the Treaties (art. 220 of the former Treaty on the European Community,
now art. 19 TEU). In the light of 50-year strong acquis jurisprudentiel there is still untapped
remedial potential in art. 19 TEU („the law”, « le droit » « des Rechts », « prawo »). The
First Court of 60’s and 70’s always spoke of the authority of the law that binds together the
Union of “states, institutions and individuals”.
The rediscovery of these old precedents and building on the spirit of what former Judge of
the Court C. Kakouris called „the mission of the Court”, might be happening in Luxembourg
right now. „The effective application of EU law as an essential component of the rule of
law” (C – 441/17R), the „existence of effective judicial review as the essence of the rule of
law” (Case C – 72/15), „the guarantee of judicial independence as inherent in the
adjudication” and a prerequisite for ensuring the effective judicial protection (Case C –
64/16), and now also „mutual trust” in the performance and status of the courts in the
member states – parties to the consensus, are all essential elements of the „European First
Principles”. Respect for the rule law and trust in law are existential components of the
original consensus on which all other commitments of the parties are built. The moment
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these principles start to crumble, so will the consensus. At long last, the politics of
resentment faced a powerful enemy: European courts with their own fidelities and loyalties.
From the way Poland has rejected the Court’s order in the logging case and ridiculed the
Court’s judges, it is clear that the constitutional stakes could not be higher: survival and
long-term viability of the consensus, the parties’ continuing desire to belong to the
consensus and to be bound by its First Principles.
With this, the time of „mega-politics” has indeed arrived …
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